please empty your brain below

What you described is quite mad. Your photo shows quite clearly that the gap between train and platform at the end doors of each car is bigger than the gap at the centre doors. Clearly the situation would be reversed at platform 13. Perhaps this is a temporary blanket solution until through running start.
How very odd.

If gaps are now unacceptable for new trains I do wonder how the Chingford Line will cope! St James St has an enoooooooormous gap!
If you had stayed in the carriage you might have heard the "Caution, the train is about to move" announcement.
It does seem that one of your explanations for the incorrect door being locked out is probably correct.

However, due to the sheer numbers of people falling down between the train and the platform (the numbers really are worryingly huge nationwide) we now need saving from ourselves with techniques, preferably properly applied, like this.

And if it’s huge gaps you’re after, Clapham Junction platform 17 must win some kind of award!
As a regular user of these services, *it is my understanding* that some platform gaps at Paddington are quite large where the middle of the carriages are on the 345s. These are the only trains at PAD with doors at those points and the carriages are longer anyway(?), so this is exacerbated.

I wouldn’t say the gaps are massive in comparison to other stations, but I was generally (and cautiously) supportive of this once I heard that explanation.

The 345s mostly use P11, then P14. As you have shown, and from what I’ve seen, they don’t seem that bad at all. I don’t know how much potential use of other platforms has been considered with this, where there could well be (much) bigger gaps due to the curvature of the station. I assume they can’t program per platform as there’s not enough notice, could get it wrong, etc. I guess for newer trains with such features there’s also an element of being safe rather than sorry and trying to avoid any legal action down the line if there was an accident.

Totally with you re: the DLR announcements, though, from what I’ve observed at Crossharbour and Island Gardens - absolutely ludicrous!
http://www.districtdavesforum.co.uk/class-345-introduction?page=40

The discussion around July 17th might explain what's going on. I speculated that the problem seems to be only on platforms which curve concavely relative to the train, but the system is not sophisticated enough to reliably identify which platform the train is using
"sheer numbers .... worryingly huge" How many, Joe? Hundreds each year? Thousands?.

I'm not convinced that closing the doors demonstrably closest to the platform is going to help at all.
Certainly in the hundreds, which is worrying enough!

As I said, I think DG’s explanations for the incorrect door being locked out were probably right. Certainly locking the wrong door out is not going to help things much!
Try getting on a train at Lewisham on platform 2, the gap towards the back of the station is at least a foot wide
Recent figures on the Underground confirm an annual total of 200-300 falls at the Passenger Train Interface.

Less than one a day.
One in every 4 million journeys.
That’s just the Underground, and that’s still a large number of accidents
In its central tunnel sections, Crossrail will have a platform height of 1100mm with level access over a narrow gap.

Outside the central section, Crossrail trains will not have level access. Platforms on routes out of Liverpool Street are generally higher than the 915mm standard, while those out of Paddington are generally lower. Some work is being done to resolve these issues.

https://www.railengineer.uk/2017/01/17/mind-the-gap-2
An incident once a month in an individual location would probably merit some sort of warning/safety measure.

Comparisons in isolation to the total number of journeys may not be the most informative statistical tool.
For what it is worth, I found some stats over here.

So, in 2016-17, 15 passenger fatalities from all reasons. By comparison, there were about 1,700 road deaths. Almost 1,500 injuries from "platform edge incidents". But nearly 3,500 from "slips, trips and falls". Hard to tell how much of that is from failing to mind the gap.

Only 10 people per day recorded hurting themselves by falling over on a train or at a station, and another 5 at the plaform edge... It is easy to say that one is too many, but life is risky, and trains are already comparatively safe. A cost / benefit calculation is needed here.
Great research. I bet that when in full service, there will be slip/trips/falls and alarm signals consequences from this fully unexpected situation. Hence delays and frustration. It would be better to arrange for deploying gap filling plates ( I seem to remember seeing them in some country). Or moving the middle carriage to the end of the trains ;-)
If it is the start of a trend, I look forward to entire platforms at Clapham Junction going out of service, and indeed entire stations elsewhere on the network.

On a more serious note, some of the most dangerous gaps are on straight platforms and are purely down to height difference (try the front carriage, southbound at Hackbridge sometime). Surely that should be easy to fix and it's pure not-giving-a-shit-ness that keeps it that way? So is the sudden attention down to a TfL vs. NR mindset?
I think you need to be a bit careful with the 'only one a day' and 'health and safety gone mad' arguments.

In genuine cases where there is a risk you also have to consider the level of disruption when an incident happens. If you play totally by the rule book nothing should move and the Railway Accident Investigation Board (RAIB) should be called and wait until they give permission for things to resume. In reality, even without such extreme measures, there is bound to be a delay and it will probably take hours to eliminate the knock-on effects.

So even though such nannying may seen over the top it generally makes sense for everyone's benefit.
What I actually described as "madness" was the locking of a door at a small gap, and the unlocking of doors at more significant gaps.
Timbo appears to have got it right. A concave platform puts the gap in the middle and a convex one puts it at the ends. If the system cannot tell the difference between platforms it is not fit for purpose.
Health and Safety requirements are usually to reduce the risk 'as low as reasonable practicable'
The argument / heated discussion is inevitably over what is reasonable. The good point made by Pedantic of Purley on levels of disruption resultant in any incident being considered as part of a risk assessment is a relevant aspect I never previously considered.
If we're talking significant height jumps (such as front carriage/Hackbridge as mentioned by Chz), I don't know what Ealing Broadway platform 2 (fast eastbound) will be like for 345s - but with 360s it's less a step down and more a small fall.

If anyone knows what gap-minding provision will be made for not only the slow platforms used during weekdays, but the fast ones which will be occasionally used by Crossrail trains out of Paddington/Liverpool Street, let me know...
The Kaohsiung Metro really takes the mick. Announcements in 5 languages, including "Please Mind The Gap". There is no gap: you couldn't fit a pencil between the platform and the train floor!
Is there is a rule of thumb for height differences and horizontal distances between platform and carriage door threshold, like the 1 inch rule for paving slabs, when the gap should be addressed to avoid accidents? Presumably there is a safety standard of some sort that sets a maximum.
Two wild guesses.

One, the doors were actually out of order.

Two, the "MIND THE GAP" outside that particular set of doors looks like in wet paint.

dg writes: No to both of those.
Also, something interesting:
"The middle doors *may* not open at the next station. Please use other doors."

"May" not open? Are there circumstances where they *will* open?
It's interesting that the designers of these new trains have obviously spent quite a lot of time and money on a selective door locking system. I wonder why this money could not have gone towards a gap-safe step that could retract and extend as required. The technology exists. Presumably the specification is based on the assumption that these trains will generally operate from straight platforms.
@anon
"Are there circumstances where they *will* open?" Yes. In the first few carriages where the platforms are straight enough for all the doors to open.
This is why we have the new Shoreditch High Street station: it was thought the old Shoreditch, above the Old Street junction, had platforms which were on too much of a curve to start using again. Shame.
The ideal is obviously all straight platforms, or every train to have mechanical gap-fillers. And every platform to be at the right height for every train. Obviously we are a long way from that ideal. (Mechanical gap-fillers are available, but are expensive to provide, particularly with the required reliability).

What DG has highlighted is one particular interim measure, intended to help. Obviously at the platform he mentions, it is not actually doing anything of the kind.
kev writes "If the system cannot tell the difference between platforms it is not fit for purpose."

Unfortunately, these systems usually cannot tell the difference between platforms. For example, southbound trains from Victoria calling at Battersea park regularly have an announcement that passengers can only alight from the front 8 carriages, despite the fact that they can alight from all 10. The down slow platform is 10 carriages long, but the down fast - which I have never seen in use - is only 8 long.

However, on these trains the door selection appears to be under control of the driver, and doors on all 10 carriages are opened. In DG's case, I wonder whether it's automatic or whether the driver was just doing it irrespective of the platform?
I have heard "mind the gap" at Queenstown Road, on a train not scheduled to call there and with a gap of four running lines between the train and the nearest platform!
End doors, and the resulting gaps at convex platforms, have long existed. Whereas centre doors are a new development (in recent times, anyway). So those wishing to provide these doors may have been obliged to add extra safety features (for a "new" hazard).

The fact that the hazard looks pretty similar to an existing one to any normal person seems to have been missed. Along with the fact that safety messages and precautions ought to be restricted to when they are needed, rather than deployed willy-nilly.
Try boarding a Bakerloo Line train at Willesden Junction station. Not only on a bend but a big step up to get off or a big step down to join the train.
I understand that one of the reasons the Bakerloo could not be extended back to Watford Junction was because of height differences though these exist up to Harrow & Wealdstone.There's no sense in that at all even though the rules have changed. No consistency in all of this.
A few comments.

The platform / train interface (PTI) has long been the highest risk event on the Tube. It can hardly be a surprise that TfL would be as rigorous on services it contracts on the National Rail network. The ORR said a couple of years ago that Network Rail had some catching up to do to match TfL's best practice on PTI risk management. However platform reconstruction / realignment does not come cheap and without a clear regulatory or DfT instruction I doubt very much will happen in the short to medium term. It's also exacerbated where mixed designs of rolling stock serve the same platforms. Until you get consistent operation or radically redesigned trains there will always be difficulties.

Lots of people are citing examples of poor infrastructure. These are longstanding and have "grandfather rights". So long as the assets and trains don't change then nothing has to be done. This is why things are "inconsistent".

The class 345s are new trains with new door positions. It's no surprise that a different view has been taken about actual / perceived risk. I note DG's comments about some dubious application of the mitigation measures. I assume someone may go and take a look at that. We know TfL read his blog.
Simple answer to why this happens: The train doesn't know which platform it's coming into.

So a default door setting is used, matching the worst gaps on the worst platforms.
So a pragmatic and sensible solution?
...or a failure of programming, with insufficient override.
PC, agreed. There is far worse on the main line, and the “where there’s blame” culture is why ASLEF are so alarmed by the further deployment of DOO. We are still essentially using an 80s/90s model of driver only train dispatch which is outdated in safety terms.
When we had slamdoor stock with ten doors a side there were gaps everywhere and we knew how to get on and off the trains properly.
@Drew, it's not about 'knowing how to get on and off trains properly'. I now have restricted mobility, walk with a stick, and have particular difficulty going down steps with a deep tread...eg I can no longer walk up or down escalators. When going to Bank station, I have to ensure that I get on in the right carriage so there won't be a gap and I'll be able to get off (people aren't always helpful). If I'm going to an area where I know the station has a big step up/down from the train, like Stamford Brook, I simply don't go by train. Some of us have to travel within our limitations.
I asked about this on TfL internal comms. Apparently due to the curve of some Paddington high level platforms, the middle door ends up being a long way from the edge. Their GPS isn't quite up to telling which platform the train is at (8ft makes a difference between the middle door being nearest the edge and furthest away) so all middle doors are locked out.

dg writes: Post updated, thanks!
Sounds sensible and pragmatic then.
...or a failure of programming, with insufficient override.
I interpreted the explanation as being that the sdo operation in the trains worked on the basis of GPS - I.e. that no matter how well the SDO was implemented in this situation, it would not be possible to program it correctly and consistently.

The tone of the article is that there has been inadequate thought in the implementation of the SDO at Paddington, and I think that is a bit unfair on the apparent factual information.

If there are hardware limitations, then a failure of programming does not seem an appropriate comment. Manual override introduces much more risk, both of getting the manual override wrong, however also in distracting drivers at a busy time when platform selection may only be made at a late time. A policy of not using anymanual override and going for a consistently safer solution than not using a single default SDO application is not something I think should be the subject of criticism.
I've just checked this out on Platform 11 at Paddington. On the three carriages closest to the barrier, all doors open. On the other four carriages, the middle doors do not open. None of these doors are beside any significant gap. The middle door of the middle carriage actually overhangs the platform, but still does not open.

The only sign that these four doors won't open is that the ring of lights around the button isn't lit. If you press the button, the ring lights up red.

Conclusion: platforms 11 and 14 are fine. If there is an issue with massive gaps, it must be on other platforms.










TridentScan | Privacy Policy